Quincy Document

I found a very important document from the quincy accident:

it is the lock pin schematic for moving forward with my first new project.

New Project 2

Another New Project I will be doing is the effects of passenger involvement during takeoff and landing with Live TV not being turned off during critical phases of flight.

I flew jetblue and came up with some interesting thoughts for a new controversial article.

New Project

ARFF Drill at DAB

The drill conducted  was a success. The combined efforts of all emergency responders along with ARFF provided a very realistic and interesting environment that a classroom could never prepare us for. As with all drills, there were things that were outstanding, and things that could use polishing.

Some of the good things were:

·         Operations response time to the incident was amazing. The operations truck got on scene before our last occupant had reached the cone. (Myself and my fellow flight attendant)

·         When EVAC was trying to find the flight attendants, which would make occupant 30 and 31, we let them find us to make it more realistic. People tend to get lost and the number counts change throughout the first hour of the accident.

·         Switching the runway on ARFF was definitely a good idea.  ARFF had staged for our touchdown on Runway 7L, but because due to the severity of the incident onboard, our captain had decided there was no time for ops to clear the disabled aircraft already out on on 7L and we changed runways to runway 16. This challenged ARFF to use taxiways and cross the active runway a few times bringing the communication of ATC into account.

·         It was good we practiced on a regional aircraft, with very close to the amount of passengers who would be on the manifest since the past 7 major fatal accidents have been regional’s.

·         Use of forceful entry tools to get the flight deck occupants out.

Some of the things that needed constructive criticism:

·         Ops needed to take into consideration the isolation of the flight crew more seriously. It is something that may or may not be thought of, but the airline wants their flight attendants and pilots who are not transported to be isolated from the media and other sources of outside information. Since DAB was an out station for Oceania, the airline would not be able to take care of this because the airline doesn’t fly here. Ops would have to take us as the flight attendants somewhere to get a dereif by our airline.

·         In another drill, use the forceful entry on the cabin occupants. I understand that the flight crew were dummies and subjected to more smoke then we were, but in the real world lately, the flight deck crew have been at an advantage and the cabin occupants have been the ones needing help. Training of the forceful entry tools on cabin doors instead of making direct cuts into the fuselage may be beneficial.

Since there were more good things recognized, the drill was definitely a success. I can say as one of the flight attendants in this drill that an accident is something you can never truly prepare for. You may get trained, but what needs to happen is you need to fall back on this training. Airlines need to also screen their flight attendants heavily on their ability to perform under operations such as this.  I can attest to the fact that when given real passengers and not trained airline employees to evacuate, it’s not easy. We repeated the instructions several times to them and we still had four or so passengers attempt something completely different that would have endangered themselves or someone else’s life had this been a real accident with fire.

In regards to the post crash environment itself, I can only say you can never prepare yourself or tell yourself its only a drill. The entrapping feeling, the panic, the  smoke, the running, the sirens, the scene itself and seeing a carseat with a baby…I thought I was prepared to deal with this. When I saw the ARFF guy walking towards us with the carseat and the baby doll strapped in, it was a sick feeling even though he was a doll. Being trapped in the simulator in the dark and all you could hear were sirens coming towards you, was a very strange un-welcoming feeling.

The fact that this was a drill disappeared for my fellow flight attendant and I. We were standing together on a real airplane and the 29 other occupants who had survived the impact became our first and only priority.

It was an experience that I wish I could have everyone who flies go through. It was emotional yet educational. I had mixed emotions watching and timing different responses, and as we were “waiting” for them, it felt like a lifetime an how scary that can feel.  It also shows you as the flight crew how important their training is and that they truly need to take a command role in getting their post impact survivors out anyway possible because your response from these services may be delayed when you have an unanticipated impact.

All in all, it is an experience I will never forget, nor would want to. This drill was everything that Alert III stands for, and a true example of what the project is meant to cover. An accident that was a survivable impact for some or all and the occupants need to get out alive.

I thank all my fellow Embry Riddle students who helped out as well as the Daytona State College Students, ARFF personnel, EVAC, DBFD, DAB ops and everyone else who made this drill as successful as it was.

Ground Taxi Safety

GTX is a system that I designed that will help eliminate aircraft from taxing into the wrong position onto a runway that is closed or out of serivce.

The system will consist of an aircraft based system that would allow pilots to determine their position at any time while moving about all operations area, a solar powered ground transceivers mounted at different intervals to relay signals, and an interactive system to be utilized by ground controllers at airports to assign movements to aircraft on all operations areas of the airport.

The system would be a sun pass type box in teh cockpit that will display different LED on a moving blocklight system (Red, Amber, Green)

The goal is to eliminate accidents and runway collisions.

Seatbelt Cutters

When United Express Flight 5925 collided with the King Air on the runway in Quincy IL, everyone survived the initial impact but the passengers didn’t know how to release their seatbelts to evacuate the aircraft. After this accident, the FAA made it mandatory to demo the seatbelt under 121.571 along with other safety features of the airplane. 

In flight attending most flight attendants are aware of the blood rule, "If you dont get yourself out, you won’t survive." Yes, flight attendants sit in their jumpseats looking pretty but when the macaroni and cheese hits the fan, the flight attendant and his/her ABPs are the most important people in that cabin to remain alive for the other surviving passengers. In short, Get as many out as possible without endangering yourself. Sounds selfish. But true. 

Over my vast amounts of flying and talking to passengers, one of the top items was "What do I do if my seatbelt fails to unbuckle? Will I be trapped?" The answer is pretty much yes. We can look at Eastern Airlines Flight 401 in the everglades back in the 70s. When the L1011 hit the water, flight attendants were found alive harnessed to their jumpseats and passengers were found alive strapped into their seats trapped. When the seats started to submerge, the passengers were going under with them. Same scenario in UsAir Flight 5050 and UsAir 481 that went into the drink in LGA. Passengers were drowning because their buckles wouldn’t move. 

In a low speed, shallow angle accident, the chances of survival are at its highest. This is the type of accident we're most likely going to find our flight attendants, pilots, and passengers alive and the seat tracks most likely intact. This is good and what we hope for, but still if there is an immediate hazard to the passenger, how do we fix it so we get the passenger out of the cabin fighting a stubborn safety harness. 

The idea for seatbelt cutters first came to me when I saw them on the bus ride to high school one day. Granted this was in a post 9/11 world where blades are not part of the friendly skies, i was met with a challenge. 

Can we find a way to get a seatbelt cutter onboard an airplane without having the blade used to fight back against crew to take control of the airplane? Yes. The seatbelt cutters do not have exposed blades that could be used to hijack an airplane. 

Next, Where would we put them? 
Well as the flight attendant is the most important person in the cabin when the mac and cheese hits the fan, we want them to be as accessible as the flashlight. Just as the flashlight floats with the beam pointing up, we would make these cutters buoyant with reflective colors such as orange like a crew life vest. 

The flight attendant could also use them for himself/herself if her/his harness was to ever fail. 

Commitment to Safety Statement

Commitment to Safety Statement

My name is Michael Rossi and I am a senior at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach Florida. I am an Aviation Safety major and I live the “Jettlink Safety Culture” all day, every day.  Before I get into the body of my commitment statement, I would like to make one thing very clear.

Committed aviation safety professionals do not do what we do just because we can; we do it because we WANT to do it and make our industry better!

Losing Kelly in August of 2006 was something that I was not prepared for. For the first time, an aviation fatality had affected my life. I remember on the flight back to EWR thinking “Kel, I don’t know what happened today, I don’t know why it happened, but I’m gonna fix this. I promise.”  I am at Embry Riddle because of him and to make our industry safer for all.

I am dedicated to the safety of my passengers and crew members aboard every aircraft in our industry at any given time so that everyone remains safe from known hazards and can come home and fulfill his or her last promise.

Some people have told me that I’m not going to know every crewmember or passenger that flies for our airline or uses the industry for air travel. Although, this may be true, at my airline, they are my focus and responsibility. I look to treating every crewmember and passenger as a personal accountability of mine. Life is very fragile and in my “Not on my watch” program, I will do everything in my power to make sure that a fatality does not happen “on my watch” as your aviation safety professional. 

The challenges of accident prevention is ensuring that my crewmembers can come to work, my passengers can fly on our airline and anyone who participates in patron with our company gets to their destination safely while we as the safety professionals fight a battle of mixing human factors with machine and the unpredictable factors that sometimes play a role.

We may be able to tackle the challenge of human error in the flight deck one day, but we are not going to ever have a total grip on factors such as weather or structural failures. How we work with what we are given proves how committed we are to a safer future and the well being of our passengers and crew.

From a structural perspective, we have had some major advancement in technology that helps in detecting corrosion, stress concentrations, and fatigue cracks. On the weather side we have installed wonderful weather relaying devices for our air traffic controllers and flight deck crews but we cannot ever be too “comfortable” with these advancements and must try to remain ahead of the unpredictable.

Another unpredictable and sometimes sabotaging factor in safety are disagreements between professionals. Disagreements and difference in opinion will happen. Not everyone is going to agree but as long as the disagreement is constructive and you as the crew member or panel member have an open mind to take suggestions, it’s ok for them to happen.

I can say without hesitation that I am open minded to difference in opinion. I will defend what I say but I will take into account all collaboration that results from any form of publication of an idea or concern. If it keeps my passengers and crews alive, I don’t mind learning and getting answers.

With the constant movement of airplanes we are never going to have a zero accident rate, but my commitment to this industry is to reduce our fatality rate by tackling some challenges that have been surfacing over the years. If we can take what we have learned and not allow history to repeat itself, or work on post impact issues to increase survivability, I am confident that we can reduce our fatality rate one step at a time.

In conclusion, loosing Kelly was a terrible event in my life and in the many lives of those who cared for him. We lost a crewmember, uncle, brother, boyfriend and friend. My commitment to safety has Kelly in mind everyday remembering his love to bring joy to others. I am committed to a safer future, not only for him but for the rest of us. To A Safe and Fulfilling Future!

Fed Ex's New Fire Systems

FedEx unveils the industry’s first onboard automatic fire suppression system

Written By Michael Rossi

FedEx unveils the industry’s first onboard automatic fire suppression system for extended over water (EOW) flights. The system was released after close to seven years of research from the FedEx team after losing N68055 at SWF in 1996.

The system is a network of infrared thermal sensors, foaming agents and an overhead cargo container snozzle.

If heat is detected by the sensors the fire suppression technology located above each cargo container will activate and simultaneously advise the crew that something is wrong. The snozzle, like those used on the ARFF trucks will penetrate the container and spread a non-corrosive biodegradable foam that will work on on class A, B and D fires. Materials subjected to Class C fires, will continue to be carried in the plane’s belly.

This System Vs. Other Systems

A majority of safety systems in today’s cargo aircraft are manually activated and  control fires that are in containers that the goods must be declared and labeled by the shipper as hazardous. This new system will uniformly spread through the cabin are and will automatically warn the crew which will save crucial seconds. The crew can then determine what to do next based on FAA Regulations.

Currently, regulations require that the airplane  must depressurize and divert after any inflight emergency. After a depressurization, the crew has approximately 30 minutes to land the aircraft. With the new system, the lengthy trans pacific flights can continue to fly and land at the nearest landing site. This is crucial because some of those fields may be up to three hours away.

Personally I give FedEx two thumbs up because not only are they installing these new system, they installed heads up displays on all MD-10s and MD-11s, advanced GPWS systems and runway awareness systems to all of their airplanes. FedEx seems to really care about the safety of their company, employees and the industry as a whole to try by trying to reduce the amounts of accidents and truly deliver “The World Ontime” More importantly, safely!

Air Florida Flight 90

Michael Rossi
Aviation Safety
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

"Larry We're Going Down! Larry!....I Know It!!! :::Impact::::

Quick Rundown:

Air Florida Flight 90
Washington DC National (DCA)
Tampa International (TPA)
Boeing 737-200-222
N62AF
Fatalities 74:79 On Airplane
Fatalities: 4 On The Ground

Air Florida Flight 90, or Palm 90, was a high profile accident that changed our industry forever. It showed us how poor decision after poor decision can lead to a aviation disaster. Out of this accident, CRM was looked into as a collaboration decision to take the aircraft up. Finally, it showed us the tragic effects of how when Ice and snow are thrown into the equation with an airframe, the outcome of the flight can be deadly.

On January 13 1982, Washington National Airport was under a gorgeous blanket of white snow. With the holidays just having passed, the air traffic was at a high but the amount of traffic in the DCA airport was nothing that couldn’t be handled. Being very close to the city, DCA tends to be jam packed with traffic at most parts of the day.

On this particular day, the aircraft that would become the accident aircraft (N62AF) had arrived from Miami International Airport at 1345. The airport had been closed until just around noon due to the high amounts of snow fall in the early morning.

Sitting at Gate 12, N62AF was being de-iced by spraying the wings with the de-icing agent monopropylene glycol which is the approved de-icing agent under winter operations with the FAA. When the airplane was ready to push back from the gate, the tug could not get traction on the ice covered ground. For about 5 minutes, the captain and first officer were trying to decide what to do. They finally came up with using the JT8D’s reversers to push back from the gate under its own power. This proved to be a problem as it evidently resulted in the engines ingesting ice and snow. Once the aircraft was alive, the pilots took the aircraft under her own power out onto the snowy taxiway and lined up behind a New York Air DC-9. For forty nine minutes, the only open runway was being used for a takeoff, then a landing, a take off, and a landing and so on.

Nearly 55 minutes after pushback, the pilot decided not to return the 737 to the gate for another coating of the monopropylene glycol de-ice solution fearing that a re-application would further delay their flight. The captain and first officer had still not activated the 737’s anti ice system.
Creeping behind the DC-9 to the runway, the pilot and first officer decided that they would maneuver the aircraft so close to the DC-9 that the exhaust gases would melt the buildup of snow and ice on the wings. The First Officer said, “It’s a losing battle trying to de-ice these things. It gives you a false feeling of security, that’s all it does.” The captain replied, “Well it satisfies the Feds.” The captain was basically saying at this point that he had met the FAR requirements to shut the FAA up to show some compliance.

As the plane began its takeoff roll, the first officer finally noticed several times that the readings he was seeing on the engine panels didn’t reflect reality.

As the plane became airborne for a brief amount of time, the stick shaker immediately activated which was picked up on the CVR along with the famous last words of the First Officer to the Captain saying, “Larry We’re going down! Larry…” Which the captain replied a frantic, “I Know it!” The plane impacted the 14th street bridge at 1601 pm, nearly an hour after the 737 left the gate.

Now we can take a look into the accident.

First, we take a look at the weather. The airport should have remained closed with the given weather report. The amount of snow fall that morning should have grounded everyone at DCA.

Next, the fact the pilot decided to use the reversers. If the tug couldn’t get the traction, there was obviously a problem with the weather and Icing. However, the captain’s descion to use the reversers proved to be a mistake as the engines ingested more snow, sludge and ice which got logged into the engine itself giving the false readings on the panel that the first officer alluded to.

Next, trailing the DC-9 so closely. The captain was under the impression to reduce his delay, instead of going back to the gate to get the re-application of monopropylene glycol de icer, he would trail the New York Air DC-9 and the hot gases from the engine would melt the ice on his wings. He was correct HOWEVER, during the takeoff roll, the sludge that had melted from the gases, re-froze because the de-ice system was not activated. There was also the build up in the inside of the nacelles that was ingested during pushback.

Next, the captain knew there was ice! If he didn’t know there was ice, he wouldn’t have trailed the DC-9 with his theory. Common sense would say to bring the airplane back in to get the ice taken care of. The pilot didn’t want to induce more of a delay however. If for some reason we accept that as ok, then why wasn’t the DE-ice system on for the wings and engine nacelles? It wasn’t like it was a guessing game. It was snowing! His comment on “It will satisfy the feds” proves he was more concerned about meeting the minimums.

Last Thing is not listening to his first officer. Yes, CRM has evolved but the first officer suggested at least two or three things before the takeoff roll that should have prevented this accident if nothing else.

A person’s poor decision along with the push from dispatch to get the airplane out on time, wrecked a perfectly good 737 and took the lives of 78 lives that January day. However, along with the negatives, this accident provided us with a way to look into safer winter operations and better Crew Resource management. It is very sad that 78 people had to perish in order for us to find this out

Living A Safety Culture

These are basic guiding principals for an organization so that every employee comes to work and comes home safely.

Safety Begins With Me
I will report anything that i see to be unsafe or needing immediate or any kind of correction

Walk The Walk
I personally belive in the safety culture of the company and talk the talk, and WALK THE WALK

I am Responsible
For the well being and safety of the company. This is my company and my chocies affect everything about it

Employee Injuries Dont Just Happen
Every accident is preventable.

Fun! Flying is fun. Let's have fun doing it! L

When is an Aircraft Too Old

Source: When is an Aircraft Too Old?  AOPA

          The author begins the article by comparing the aircraft to a person. When people and airplanes grow older they tend to become more “maintenance intensive” requiring more attention to details and replacing of parts. He also says that there are owners who tend to take more out of the airplane then they can and thus they have accidents. If you were to compare this to people I would assume this to be death.

            Like many aviation professionals know, airplanes are built with a certain number of cycles in mind. A cycle is usually defined as a pressurization and depressurization of the cabin, or a takeoff or landing. Before Aloha 243, not a lot of people paid much attention to the cycle count on aircraft. After the accident of Aloha 243, (which N7311 had 89680 cycles on the airframe.) manufactures started to pay much more attention to high frequency pressurized flying.

            This leads into Corrosion. Something that came up in the Aloha 243 accident was the climate that the 737s were flying in. They were aluminum built aircraft flying in wet and salty, sometimes humid climate which definitely contributes to aircraft ageing. According to AOPA, aircraft in a dry climate will rot a lot slower in a dry, cool climate. This is not hard to understand.

            Corrosion of the airframe is not the only danger. Corrosion of the engine and casing can be very dangerous. Like airframes, engines have a defined life and there are several variables that can affect their longevity. Believe it or not frequent use is actually a good thing for the engine. It keeps the everything moving and flowing to prevent the tendency to rot. When the airplanes are parked in the desert or when the FAA grounds an airline (in the case of Valujet) Bright yellow or distinct covers are put into place to prevent humidity and other particles from entering the engine itself and rusting or damaging the engine.

            The question that AOPA has probed is does accidents increase with aircraft ages. The author states “as a general rule, no” but I want to rebut for the sake of argument really tweaking his words. I think the author needs to specify which may be redundant to the article but still, mention that “as a general rule with proper care or overhaul no.” If we look at Valujet’s fleet age with a average age of 27years (now, being 21 ½ I’m not saying 27 is old by any means for a person) the DC-9s were in desperate need of some sort of proper care from new parts to possibly new engines completely. I can even tie this example into corrosion and cycles because Valujet got their DC-9s from a hot, humid environment of third world countries that were using these aircraft for high frequency travel.

            Another thing that author mentions is parking the airplanes increasing the aging process. It’s not an immediate safety problem according to AOPA but it puts the burden on the owners to pay for the maintenance when we bring those airplanes back into service. If the aircraft is outside, the aircraft tends to corrode much faster. Are we seeing a pattern yet? Corrosion is the root of evil. Window age with parking aircraft is another issue the author brings up. It tends to make a permanent haze which starts to make it harder to see and avoid other aircraft. Solution? Big airpark owners put foil on the aircraft’s windows and landing gear to prevent sun ageing and to prevent the heat build up to cause fire.

            Fire can be created by a number of things with heat being a big one when insulation fails on older aircraft. Wiring is another one. If older wiring is not paid attention to, a fire may not occur (Copa 291) but a 737 can crash into the jungle from aging instrumentation wiring. Speaking of which, Gyros are usually the first instruments to go. This is because of the tendency of them to move. But how would you know exactly what failed?

            An NTSB investigator knowing how structures works would be able to tell when something was corroded or rubbed together by leaving marks or fracture. Gaskets and hoses or anything that continually rubs against something else will need periodic attention to prevent contamination of fuels. This like the 25 cent Sabertech incident, a two dollar rubber ring could save an aircraft from a fatal problem all together.

            In summary prolonging the life of the aircraft is like humans. If we take care of our aircraft (our body) we won’t have an accident. It’s a good theory butt accidents will happen, but maintain the airplane, we are reducing the likelihood it will happen.

Delta Connection Flight 4951

Hello all. Of course I have an opinion about the video that was released. So let's hear it and get it over with.

I know that passengers want to get videos of unusual events like this but to me, their safety is more important. Especially in an emergency landing where G forces will be displaced to the occupant. We all know that when the landing gear is not there, the energy will be displaced to the fuselage, then to the seat rails, then to the seat, then to Joe Blo recording his video. The landing gear is a very critcal comoponent when it comes to absorbing vertical Gs.

And hello, our bodies don't take vertical G's very well. We only take 15Gs for 0.10 seconds well. Yes this was a very low speed impact, but still, PUT THE CAMERA DOWN and brace yourself! She's not yelling at you for nothing.

Water Water Everywhere!
"The Short Amount of time to prepare is on the Jumpseat"Did you know that 44 out of 50 of the busiest United States airports are located within 5 miles of a significant body of water? How about that 194 out of 256 of the large airports worldwide have at least one overwater approach?

Over the past three decades of air travel the likelihood of a jet actually making a landing in the water and staying in one piece almost seemed something of a fairy tail. However, with the ditching of the Overseas National Airlines DC-9 off St Croix and Sully's famous landing in the Hudson river, it was shown that people can survive these accidents. Other incidents like and the hijacked Ethiopian Airlines 767 in the Indian Ocean and Air Florida Flight 90 have also shown us that there are still chances of survival even in  a non-level wing attempt to land. These however raised other concerns which will be listed later.
First, let’s start off by defining  terms:

According to the FAA a:

Ditching: is a planned emergency event in which good time allows to don life vests, warn flight attendants of proper evacuation procedures and the aircraft remains under control.

Inadvertent Water Landing: is an emergency landing in which there is little or no time for passengers and crew to prepare the cabin or themselves for the landing.

EOW: Extended Over Water Flight which is considered a route 50nm in horizontal distance from the coastline.

Flotation Equipment & Demo
On an Extended Over Water Flight or EOW, all flotation equipment must be mentioned in the safety briefing. Notice the key word, mentioned. Not demoed even though the FAR requires an oral demonstration of all equipment. However, the demos rarely if ever, will cover a water event happening on takeoff or landing.
Flotation Equipment onboard will vary in nature but generally includes Life Cots and Infant Life Vests for children weighing less than 35lbs, Adult Lifevests, Slide/Rafts, Auxiliary Life Rafts, and seat cushions.Personal Flotation
Seat Cushions:Seat Cushions, although wonderful flotation aids have a few problems associated with them. They are big and bulky, they take up space in the aisles and reduce critical maneuverability through exits, and especially the overwing exits can present a timely egress problem. Seat cushions also require passengers to grasp the cushion firmly to remain near the cushion. If for instance, the water is cold and the victim becomes overcome by hypothermia, the victim will lose grip and the cushion will float away causing the victim to drown.


Life Vests:The current life vest design has proven itself to be a very effective design. However with the era of cost cutting, airlines have experimented with the idea of single chamber life jackets. This may be cost effective but every now and then, one chamber fails to inflate. a dual chamber jacket would have a safety redundancy in it. Luckily, the jackets with one chamber still have the oral inflation tubes.
Oral Inflation Tubes:According to the FAA, the oral inflation tubes is the preferred method to inflating the life jacket because it gives the occupant most leeway with adjusting the vest to their desired inflation. However, once the vest becomes over inflated, the occupants generally panic because they do not know the proper way to let air out of the vest. Proper way to relieve inflation is to use the one finger "air quote" method on the tubes. Place your fingers into the tubes pushing down on the safety valve. You will feel the vest deflate slowly. This is a good method to re-adjust when entering the water. Wearing a collar shirt also protects the occupant from the vest rubbing against the neck creating irritation and a chocking feeling.

Crew Communication IssuesAs expected, most times than not, the Flight Attendant Manual and Flight Operations Manual will outline different procedures for water landings.

For example, in the "ditch switch" (a switch that needs to be moved in the flight deck) will not appear in the flight attendant manual where how to properly drop the sea anchor will not appear in the flight operations manual.Another thing that is generally overlooked but a very important factor is the fact that signals from flight deck to cabin may not be standardized even at the same airline. Flight attendants need to be aware of the events unfolding to have the upmost preparation in a short amount of time.

Some examples of the above topics include UsAirways Flight 1549 and Air Florida Flight 90 because both occurred in the frigid winter waters of the northeast in January. Further, other things to consider with these two accidents were they both happened on takeoff giving the crew very little time to react to the given situation, they both had post crash survival issues such as hypothermia, and the flight attendants needed to anticipate the emergency quickly on their own, on the Jumpseat!

Good practice is for flight attendants to conduct the following silent briefing on their jumpseat on an EOW:
1. What Commands Do Passengers Expect To Hear?
2. What Flotation Devices are onboard?
3. Where are the rafts?

Anticipation is the best defense against the unexpected!

Racing The Storm: The Tale Of Flight 1420

Whenever I talk about American Airlines Flight 1420, the phrase "Should Have Never Left Dallas" is the first phrase that exits my mouth first.


Quick Rundown:


American Airlines Flight 1420
Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW)
Little Rock National Airport (LIT)
McDonnell Douglas MD-82
N215AA


As Flight 1420 sat at the gate in Dallas, dispatch was pushing the crew to expedite the departure of flight 1420 to race the storm that was scheduled into the Little Rock area later around their arrival time. As 1420 pushed off the gate, the first officer recited that their alternate airport was Nashville (BNA). The first officer was a recent hire to American Airlines. The Captain was the chief pilot for the MD-80 using flight 1420 to maintain his line flying currency. 


Once airborne, the flight was normal, drinks were served, people dozed of, and the flight seemed to be perfectly normal until the first officer got a message from dispatch to "Expedite their arrival." The first officer continued to monitor the airplane's radar cone ahead of them and there were clumps of red and amber indicating very heavy storms. Two wind shear reports were reported to the aircraft over the radio approximately two minutes later of the first officer's questioning weather to continue their approach to Little Rock. 

Weather Radar Over Little Rock June 1 1999 as AA1420 approached the feild

As the aircraft continued it's approach to the Little Rock area, a severe thunderstorm approached the feild and the controller's last report to the aircraft before touchdown stated winds at 330degrees, at 28 knots. This exceeded the MD-82's cross wind limitation for a safe landing on a wet runway.


The Captain, who again was the chief pilot for the MD-80 over ruled the first officer's questioning and decided to continue with the approach. With the continued push from dispatch to get the airplane on the ground, both pilots forgot a critical component of the landing checklist that sealed the aircraft's fate; arming the ground spoilers.


The MD-82 crossed the piano keys no later then 2355CST and slammed onto the tarmac according to passengers. The CVR picked up "We're down......we're sliding! We're sliding!" From the First Officer. The captain put in full brake input and reverse to the number one engine. With the contaminated runway and the lack of ground spoilers, the braking was ineffective. The MD-82 was still flying in theory. The MD-82 overran the runway and hit the ILS tower at the end of the runway. The accident claimed the lives of 11 including the captain.

The Morning after the accident

What We Missed; What We Learned


1) Leaving Dallas


The crew was very aware that there were terrible storms in the area. The choice to leave Dallas, and then to not use Nashville was a combined problem between the crew and the push from dispatch to get that aircraft to Little Rock.


2) Diversion to Nashville


Again, with the terrible storms approaching Little Rock, Nashville should have been utilized in my opinion. Yes the push from dispatch was there so that the aircraft could be used for the morning flight out of Little Rock and the crew was very close to timing out. However, neither the crew, nor aircraft returned to Dallas that next morning.


3) Spoilers


Witnesses over the wings say that "no devices popped up upon landing." This is consistent with the fact that the spoilers did not show up on the FDR. As we know, once the main struts compress, the spoilers will pop up on the wings to spoil the lift on the wing helping with braking. 


4) Crew Dynamics


The first officer was a new hire flying with the chief pilot of the MD-82. Better pairing of crews should be considered in the future.


5) ILS Tower


When the MD-80 departed the runway and hit the ILS tower, the aircraft broke into 3. Normally this wouldnt have been such a problem and puzzled NTSB investigators for quite sometime. The previous ILS tower at LIT had been taken away in a flood in the current of the Arkansas river which is at the departure end of 4L. Usually these structures would break away upon an impact, but to prevent being swept away, this ILS tower was built rigid and reinforced on purpose.


6)EMAS


Little Rock did not have an arresting system at the time of the accident. Updates have been made to LIT.


Why Didn't They Live? 


American Airlines Flight 1420 was a survivable impact and a survivable accident as per the NTSB. We did loose 10 passengers and the captain because the deceleration forces did not remain within human tolerances for some as well as those affected by post crash factors.


The captain was killed instantly upon striking the ILS tower when the structure penetrated the cockpit shell. 


A passenger in 27E was killed instantly when the aircraft stopped violently because he was standing up on landing without a proper restraint.


The remaining passengers were killed with lack of fuselage and seat track integrity. They were all located in areas where the aircraft split into one of three places.


Finally an evacuation concern that popped up in this accident was proper evacuation using the tailcone on MD-80 family aircraft.


The squat switch  is in the landing gear on many aircraft, on the DC-9 family in particular it is a fail safe for tailcone deployment. If deployed in water, the tailcone sill is below the water level so it would take in water and the weight of the engines and groups of people was always a concern during water evacuaton but more so the sill level. In a dry evacuation it is there to prevent deployment in belly landings or when the landing gear is torn off  because the height needed to jetison the tailcone is not there and it would jam causing a secodary impact hazard. Luckily the flight attendant had seen in a bolt of lighting that during the impact with the ILS tower, the tailcone had separated just enough to squeeze 4 people out.

Basics of Survival

The study of survivability Is defined as determining to what extent the  injured or killed were unnecessarily injured or killed and taking that the information and fixing it.

In order to survive the accident, the occupant must survive the impact first. In order to survive the impact, the following criteria need to be met:

• Occupiable Living Space
• G forces remain within human tolerance.

Once the occupant survives the impact, in order to survive the accident the following criteria need to be met:

• Occupiable Living Space
• G forces remain within human tolerance.
• Post Crash Factors must be taken into account

Post Crash Factors

A survivable accident is an event in which there is enough habitable living space for the occupant, the deceleration forces remain within human tolerances and the post crash factors of Environment, Fire, Entrapment, Egress and Drowning are taken into account.