Michael Rossi
Aviation Safety
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
"Larry We're Going Down! Larry!....I Know It!!! :::Impact::::
Quick Rundown:
Air Florida Flight 90
Washington DC National (DCA)
Tampa International (TPA)
Boeing 737-200-222
N62AF
Fatalities 74:79 On Airplane
Fatalities: 4 On The Ground
Air Florida Flight 90, or Palm 90, was a high profile accident that changed our industry forever. It showed us how poor decision after poor decision can lead to a aviation disaster. Out of this accident, CRM was looked into as a collaboration decision to take the aircraft up. Finally, it showed us the tragic effects of how when Ice and snow are thrown into the equation with an airframe, the outcome of the flight can be deadly.
On January 13 1982, Washington National Airport was under a gorgeous blanket of white snow. With the holidays just having passed, the air traffic was at a high but the amount of traffic in the DCA airport was nothing that couldn’t be handled. Being very close to the city, DCA tends to be jam packed with traffic at most parts of the day.
On this particular day, the aircraft that would become the accident aircraft (N62AF) had arrived from Miami International Airport at 1345. The airport had been closed until just around noon due to the high amounts of snow fall in the early morning.
Sitting at Gate 12, N62AF was being de-iced by spraying the wings with the de-icing agent monopropylene glycol which is the approved de-icing agent under winter operations with the FAA. When the airplane was ready to push back from the gate, the tug could not get traction on the ice covered ground. For about 5 minutes, the captain and first officer were trying to decide what to do. They finally came up with using the JT8D’s reversers to push back from the gate under its own power. This proved to be a problem as it evidently resulted in the engines ingesting ice and snow. Once the aircraft was alive, the pilots took the aircraft under her own power out onto the snowy taxiway and lined up behind a New York Air DC-9. For forty nine minutes, the only open runway was being used for a takeoff, then a landing, a take off, and a landing and so on.
Nearly 55 minutes after pushback, the pilot decided not to return the 737 to the gate for another coating of the monopropylene glycol de-ice solution fearing that a re-application would further delay their flight. The captain and first officer had still not activated the 737’s anti ice system.
Creeping behind the DC-9 to the runway, the pilot and first officer decided that they would maneuver the aircraft so close to the DC-9 that the exhaust gases would melt the buildup of snow and ice on the wings. The First Officer said, “It’s a losing battle trying to de-ice these things. It gives you a false feeling of security, that’s all it does.” The captain replied, “Well it satisfies the Feds.” The captain was basically saying at this point that he had met the FAR requirements to shut the FAA up to show some compliance.
As the plane began its takeoff roll, the first officer finally noticed several times that the readings he was seeing on the engine panels didn’t reflect reality.
As the plane became airborne for a brief amount of time, the stick shaker immediately activated which was picked up on the CVR along with the famous last words of the First Officer to the Captain saying, “Larry We’re going down! Larry…” Which the captain replied a frantic, “I Know it!” The plane impacted the 14th street bridge at 1601 pm, nearly an hour after the 737 left the gate.
Now we can take a look into the accident.
First, we take a look at the weather. The airport should have remained closed with the given weather report. The amount of snow fall that morning should have grounded everyone at DCA.
Next, the fact the pilot decided to use the reversers. If the tug couldn’t get the traction, there was obviously a problem with the weather and Icing. However, the captain’s descion to use the reversers proved to be a mistake as the engines ingested more snow, sludge and ice which got logged into the engine itself giving the false readings on the panel that the first officer alluded to.
Next, trailing the DC-9 so closely. The captain was under the impression to reduce his delay, instead of going back to the gate to get the re-application of monopropylene glycol de icer, he would trail the New York Air DC-9 and the hot gases from the engine would melt the ice on his wings. He was correct HOWEVER, during the takeoff roll, the sludge that had melted from the gases, re-froze because the de-ice system was not activated. There was also the build up in the inside of the nacelles that was ingested during pushback.
Next, the captain knew there was ice! If he didn’t know there was ice, he wouldn’t have trailed the DC-9 with his theory. Common sense would say to bring the airplane back in to get the ice taken care of. The pilot didn’t want to induce more of a delay however. If for some reason we accept that as ok, then why wasn’t the DE-ice system on for the wings and engine nacelles? It wasn’t like it was a guessing game. It was snowing! His comment on “It will satisfy the feds” proves he was more concerned about meeting the minimums.
Last Thing is not listening to his first officer. Yes, CRM has evolved but the first officer suggested at least two or three things before the takeoff roll that should have prevented this accident if nothing else.
A person’s poor decision along with the push from dispatch to get the airplane out on time, wrecked a perfectly good 737 and took the lives of 78 lives that January day. However, along with the negatives, this accident provided us with a way to look into safer winter operations and better Crew Resource management. It is very sad that 78 people had to perish in order for us to find this out
Aviation Safety
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
"Larry We're Going Down! Larry!....I Know It!!! :::Impact::::
Quick Rundown:
Air Florida Flight 90
Washington DC National (DCA)
Tampa International (TPA)
Boeing 737-200-222
N62AF
Fatalities 74:79 On Airplane
Fatalities: 4 On The Ground
Air Florida Flight 90, or Palm 90, was a high profile accident that changed our industry forever. It showed us how poor decision after poor decision can lead to a aviation disaster. Out of this accident, CRM was looked into as a collaboration decision to take the aircraft up. Finally, it showed us the tragic effects of how when Ice and snow are thrown into the equation with an airframe, the outcome of the flight can be deadly.
On January 13 1982, Washington National Airport was under a gorgeous blanket of white snow. With the holidays just having passed, the air traffic was at a high but the amount of traffic in the DCA airport was nothing that couldn’t be handled. Being very close to the city, DCA tends to be jam packed with traffic at most parts of the day.
On this particular day, the aircraft that would become the accident aircraft (N62AF) had arrived from Miami International Airport at 1345. The airport had been closed until just around noon due to the high amounts of snow fall in the early morning.
Sitting at Gate 12, N62AF was being de-iced by spraying the wings with the de-icing agent monopropylene glycol which is the approved de-icing agent under winter operations with the FAA. When the airplane was ready to push back from the gate, the tug could not get traction on the ice covered ground. For about 5 minutes, the captain and first officer were trying to decide what to do. They finally came up with using the JT8D’s reversers to push back from the gate under its own power. This proved to be a problem as it evidently resulted in the engines ingesting ice and snow. Once the aircraft was alive, the pilots took the aircraft under her own power out onto the snowy taxiway and lined up behind a New York Air DC-9. For forty nine minutes, the only open runway was being used for a takeoff, then a landing, a take off, and a landing and so on.
Nearly 55 minutes after pushback, the pilot decided not to return the 737 to the gate for another coating of the monopropylene glycol de-ice solution fearing that a re-application would further delay their flight. The captain and first officer had still not activated the 737’s anti ice system.
Creeping behind the DC-9 to the runway, the pilot and first officer decided that they would maneuver the aircraft so close to the DC-9 that the exhaust gases would melt the buildup of snow and ice on the wings. The First Officer said, “It’s a losing battle trying to de-ice these things. It gives you a false feeling of security, that’s all it does.” The captain replied, “Well it satisfies the Feds.” The captain was basically saying at this point that he had met the FAR requirements to shut the FAA up to show some compliance.
As the plane began its takeoff roll, the first officer finally noticed several times that the readings he was seeing on the engine panels didn’t reflect reality.
As the plane became airborne for a brief amount of time, the stick shaker immediately activated which was picked up on the CVR along with the famous last words of the First Officer to the Captain saying, “Larry We’re going down! Larry…” Which the captain replied a frantic, “I Know it!” The plane impacted the 14th street bridge at 1601 pm, nearly an hour after the 737 left the gate.
Now we can take a look into the accident.
First, we take a look at the weather. The airport should have remained closed with the given weather report. The amount of snow fall that morning should have grounded everyone at DCA.
Next, the fact the pilot decided to use the reversers. If the tug couldn’t get the traction, there was obviously a problem with the weather and Icing. However, the captain’s descion to use the reversers proved to be a mistake as the engines ingested more snow, sludge and ice which got logged into the engine itself giving the false readings on the panel that the first officer alluded to.
Next, trailing the DC-9 so closely. The captain was under the impression to reduce his delay, instead of going back to the gate to get the re-application of monopropylene glycol de icer, he would trail the New York Air DC-9 and the hot gases from the engine would melt the ice on his wings. He was correct HOWEVER, during the takeoff roll, the sludge that had melted from the gases, re-froze because the de-ice system was not activated. There was also the build up in the inside of the nacelles that was ingested during pushback.
Next, the captain knew there was ice! If he didn’t know there was ice, he wouldn’t have trailed the DC-9 with his theory. Common sense would say to bring the airplane back in to get the ice taken care of. The pilot didn’t want to induce more of a delay however. If for some reason we accept that as ok, then why wasn’t the DE-ice system on for the wings and engine nacelles? It wasn’t like it was a guessing game. It was snowing! His comment on “It will satisfy the feds” proves he was more concerned about meeting the minimums.
Last Thing is not listening to his first officer. Yes, CRM has evolved but the first officer suggested at least two or three things before the takeoff roll that should have prevented this accident if nothing else.
A person’s poor decision along with the push from dispatch to get the airplane out on time, wrecked a perfectly good 737 and took the lives of 78 lives that January day. However, along with the negatives, this accident provided us with a way to look into safer winter operations and better Crew Resource management. It is very sad that 78 people had to perish in order for us to find this out