When United Express Flight 5925 collided with the King Air on the runway in Quincy IL, everyone survived the initial impact but the passengers didn’t know how to release their seatbelts to evacuate the aircraft. After this accident, the FAA made it mandatory to demo the seatbelt under 121.571 along with other safety features of the airplane.
In flight attending most flight attendants are aware of the blood rule, "If you dont get yourself out, you won’t survive." Yes, flight attendants sit in their jumpseats looking pretty but when the macaroni and cheese hits the fan, the flight attendant and his/her ABPs are the most important people in that cabin to remain alive for the other surviving passengers. In short, Get as many out as possible without endangering yourself. Sounds selfish. But true.
Over my vast amounts of flying and talking to passengers, one of the top items was "What do I do if my seatbelt fails to unbuckle? Will I be trapped?" The answer is pretty much yes. We can look at Eastern Airlines Flight 401 in the everglades back in the 70s. When the L1011 hit the water, flight attendants were found alive harnessed to their jumpseats and passengers were found alive strapped into their seats trapped. When the seats started to submerge, the passengers were going under with them. Same scenario in UsAir Flight 5050 and UsAir 481 that went into the drink in LGA. Passengers were drowning because their buckles wouldn’t move.
In a low speed, shallow angle accident, the chances of survival are at its highest. This is the type of accident we're most likely going to find our flight attendants, pilots, and passengers alive and the seat tracks most likely intact. This is good and what we hope for, but still if there is an immediate hazard to the passenger, how do we fix it so we get the passenger out of the cabin fighting a stubborn safety harness.
The idea for seatbelt cutters first came to me when I saw them on the bus ride to high school one day. Granted this was in a post 9/11 world where blades are not part of the friendly skies, i was met with a challenge.
Can we find a way to get a seatbelt cutter onboard an airplane without having the blade used to fight back against crew to take control of the airplane? Yes. The seatbelt cutters do not have exposed blades that could be used to hijack an airplane.
Next, Where would we put them?
Well as the flight attendant is the most important person in the cabin when the mac and cheese hits the fan, we want them to be as accessible as the flashlight. Just as the flashlight floats with the beam pointing up, we would make these cutters buoyant with reflective colors such as orange like a crew life vest.
The flight attendant could also use them for himself/herself if her/his harness was to ever fail.
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
Commitment to Safety Statement
Commitment to Safety Statement
My name is Michael Rossi and I am a senior at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach Florida. I am an Aviation Safety major and I live the “Jettlink Safety Culture” all day, every day. Before I get into the body of my commitment statement, I would like to make one thing very clear.
Committed aviation safety professionals do not do what we do just because we can; we do it because we WANT to do it and make our industry better!
Losing Kelly in August of 2006 was something that I was not prepared for. For the first time, an aviation fatality had affected my life. I remember on the flight back to EWR thinking “Kel, I don’t know what happened today, I don’t know why it happened, but I’m gonna fix this. I promise.” I am at Embry Riddle because of him and to make our industry safer for all.
I am dedicated to the safety of my passengers and crew members aboard every aircraft in our industry at any given time so that everyone remains safe from known hazards and can come home and fulfill his or her last promise.
Some people have told me that I’m not going to know every crewmember or passenger that flies for our airline or uses the industry for air travel. Although, this may be true, at my airline, they are my focus and responsibility. I look to treating every crewmember and passenger as a personal accountability of mine. Life is very fragile and in my “Not on my watch” program, I will do everything in my power to make sure that a fatality does not happen “on my watch” as your aviation safety professional.
The challenges of accident prevention is ensuring that my crewmembers can come to work, my passengers can fly on our airline and anyone who participates in patron with our company gets to their destination safely while we as the safety professionals fight a battle of mixing human factors with machine and the unpredictable factors that sometimes play a role.
We may be able to tackle the challenge of human error in the flight deck one day, but we are not going to ever have a total grip on factors such as weather or structural failures. How we work with what we are given proves how committed we are to a safer future and the well being of our passengers and crew.
From a structural perspective, we have had some major advancement in technology that helps in detecting corrosion, stress concentrations, and fatigue cracks. On the weather side we have installed wonderful weather relaying devices for our air traffic controllers and flight deck crews but we cannot ever be too “comfortable” with these advancements and must try to remain ahead of the unpredictable.
Another unpredictable and sometimes sabotaging factor in safety are disagreements between professionals. Disagreements and difference in opinion will happen. Not everyone is going to agree but as long as the disagreement is constructive and you as the crew member or panel member have an open mind to take suggestions, it’s ok for them to happen.
I can say without hesitation that I am open minded to difference in opinion. I will defend what I say but I will take into account all collaboration that results from any form of publication of an idea or concern. If it keeps my passengers and crews alive, I don’t mind learning and getting answers.
With the constant movement of airplanes we are never going to have a zero accident rate, but my commitment to this industry is to reduce our fatality rate by tackling some challenges that have been surfacing over the years. If we can take what we have learned and not allow history to repeat itself, or work on post impact issues to increase survivability, I am confident that we can reduce our fatality rate one step at a time.
In conclusion, loosing Kelly was a terrible event in my life and in the many lives of those who cared for him. We lost a crewmember, uncle, brother, boyfriend and friend. My commitment to safety has Kelly in mind everyday remembering his love to bring joy to others. I am committed to a safer future, not only for him but for the rest of us. To A Safe and Fulfilling Future!
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Fed Ex's New Fire Systems
FedEx unveils the industry’s first onboard automatic fire suppression system
Written By Michael Rossi
FedEx unveils the industry’s first onboard automatic fire suppression system for extended over water (EOW) flights. The system was released after close to seven years of research from the FedEx team after losing N68055 at SWF in 1996.
The system is a network of infrared thermal sensors, foaming agents and an overhead cargo container snozzle.
If heat is detected by the sensors the fire suppression technology located above each cargo container will activate and simultaneously advise the crew that something is wrong. The snozzle, like those used on the ARFF trucks will penetrate the container and spread a non-corrosive biodegradable foam that will work on on class A, B and D fires. Materials subjected to Class C fires, will continue to be carried in the plane’s belly.
This System Vs. Other Systems
A majority of safety systems in today’s cargo aircraft are manually activated and control fires that are in containers that the goods must be declared and labeled by the shipper as hazardous. This new system will uniformly spread through the cabin are and will automatically warn the crew which will save crucial seconds. The crew can then determine what to do next based on FAA Regulations.
Currently, regulations require that the airplane must depressurize and divert after any inflight emergency. After a depressurization, the crew has approximately 30 minutes to land the aircraft. With the new system, the lengthy trans pacific flights can continue to fly and land at the nearest landing site. This is crucial because some of those fields may be up to three hours away.
Personally I give FedEx two thumbs up because not only are they installing these new system, they installed heads up displays on all MD-10s and MD-11s, advanced GPWS systems and runway awareness systems to all of their airplanes. FedEx seems to really care about the safety of their company, employees and the industry as a whole to try by trying to reduce the amounts of accidents and truly deliver “The World Ontime” More importantly, safely!
Air Florida Flight 90
Michael Rossi
Aviation Safety
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
"Larry We're Going Down! Larry!....I Know It!!! :::Impact::::
Quick Rundown:
Air Florida Flight 90
Washington DC National (DCA)
Tampa International (TPA)
Boeing 737-200-222
N62AF
Fatalities 74:79 On Airplane
Fatalities: 4 On The Ground
Air Florida Flight 90, or Palm 90, was a high profile accident that changed our industry forever. It showed us how poor decision after poor decision can lead to a aviation disaster. Out of this accident, CRM was looked into as a collaboration decision to take the aircraft up. Finally, it showed us the tragic effects of how when Ice and snow are thrown into the equation with an airframe, the outcome of the flight can be deadly.
On January 13 1982, Washington National Airport was under a gorgeous blanket of white snow. With the holidays just having passed, the air traffic was at a high but the amount of traffic in the DCA airport was nothing that couldn’t be handled. Being very close to the city, DCA tends to be jam packed with traffic at most parts of the day.
On this particular day, the aircraft that would become the accident aircraft (N62AF) had arrived from Miami International Airport at 1345. The airport had been closed until just around noon due to the high amounts of snow fall in the early morning.
Sitting at Gate 12, N62AF was being de-iced by spraying the wings with the de-icing agent monopropylene glycol which is the approved de-icing agent under winter operations with the FAA. When the airplane was ready to push back from the gate, the tug could not get traction on the ice covered ground. For about 5 minutes, the captain and first officer were trying to decide what to do. They finally came up with using the JT8D’s reversers to push back from the gate under its own power. This proved to be a problem as it evidently resulted in the engines ingesting ice and snow. Once the aircraft was alive, the pilots took the aircraft under her own power out onto the snowy taxiway and lined up behind a New York Air DC-9. For forty nine minutes, the only open runway was being used for a takeoff, then a landing, a take off, and a landing and so on.
Nearly 55 minutes after pushback, the pilot decided not to return the 737 to the gate for another coating of the monopropylene glycol de-ice solution fearing that a re-application would further delay their flight. The captain and first officer had still not activated the 737’s anti ice system.
Creeping behind the DC-9 to the runway, the pilot and first officer decided that they would maneuver the aircraft so close to the DC-9 that the exhaust gases would melt the buildup of snow and ice on the wings. The First Officer said, “It’s a losing battle trying to de-ice these things. It gives you a false feeling of security, that’s all it does.” The captain replied, “Well it satisfies the Feds.” The captain was basically saying at this point that he had met the FAR requirements to shut the FAA up to show some compliance.
As the plane began its takeoff roll, the first officer finally noticed several times that the readings he was seeing on the engine panels didn’t reflect reality.
As the plane became airborne for a brief amount of time, the stick shaker immediately activated which was picked up on the CVR along with the famous last words of the First Officer to the Captain saying, “Larry We’re going down! Larry…” Which the captain replied a frantic, “I Know it!” The plane impacted the 14th street bridge at 1601 pm, nearly an hour after the 737 left the gate.
Now we can take a look into the accident.
First, we take a look at the weather. The airport should have remained closed with the given weather report. The amount of snow fall that morning should have grounded everyone at DCA.
Next, the fact the pilot decided to use the reversers. If the tug couldn’t get the traction, there was obviously a problem with the weather and Icing. However, the captain’s descion to use the reversers proved to be a mistake as the engines ingested more snow, sludge and ice which got logged into the engine itself giving the false readings on the panel that the first officer alluded to.
Next, trailing the DC-9 so closely. The captain was under the impression to reduce his delay, instead of going back to the gate to get the re-application of monopropylene glycol de icer, he would trail the New York Air DC-9 and the hot gases from the engine would melt the ice on his wings. He was correct HOWEVER, during the takeoff roll, the sludge that had melted from the gases, re-froze because the de-ice system was not activated. There was also the build up in the inside of the nacelles that was ingested during pushback.
Next, the captain knew there was ice! If he didn’t know there was ice, he wouldn’t have trailed the DC-9 with his theory. Common sense would say to bring the airplane back in to get the ice taken care of. The pilot didn’t want to induce more of a delay however. If for some reason we accept that as ok, then why wasn’t the DE-ice system on for the wings and engine nacelles? It wasn’t like it was a guessing game. It was snowing! His comment on “It will satisfy the feds” proves he was more concerned about meeting the minimums.
Last Thing is not listening to his first officer. Yes, CRM has evolved but the first officer suggested at least two or three things before the takeoff roll that should have prevented this accident if nothing else.
A person’s poor decision along with the push from dispatch to get the airplane out on time, wrecked a perfectly good 737 and took the lives of 78 lives that January day. However, along with the negatives, this accident provided us with a way to look into safer winter operations and better Crew Resource management. It is very sad that 78 people had to perish in order for us to find this out
Aviation Safety
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
"Larry We're Going Down! Larry!....I Know It!!! :::Impact::::
Quick Rundown:
Air Florida Flight 90
Washington DC National (DCA)
Tampa International (TPA)
Boeing 737-200-222
N62AF
Fatalities 74:79 On Airplane
Fatalities: 4 On The Ground
Air Florida Flight 90, or Palm 90, was a high profile accident that changed our industry forever. It showed us how poor decision after poor decision can lead to a aviation disaster. Out of this accident, CRM was looked into as a collaboration decision to take the aircraft up. Finally, it showed us the tragic effects of how when Ice and snow are thrown into the equation with an airframe, the outcome of the flight can be deadly.
On January 13 1982, Washington National Airport was under a gorgeous blanket of white snow. With the holidays just having passed, the air traffic was at a high but the amount of traffic in the DCA airport was nothing that couldn’t be handled. Being very close to the city, DCA tends to be jam packed with traffic at most parts of the day.
On this particular day, the aircraft that would become the accident aircraft (N62AF) had arrived from Miami International Airport at 1345. The airport had been closed until just around noon due to the high amounts of snow fall in the early morning.
Sitting at Gate 12, N62AF was being de-iced by spraying the wings with the de-icing agent monopropylene glycol which is the approved de-icing agent under winter operations with the FAA. When the airplane was ready to push back from the gate, the tug could not get traction on the ice covered ground. For about 5 minutes, the captain and first officer were trying to decide what to do. They finally came up with using the JT8D’s reversers to push back from the gate under its own power. This proved to be a problem as it evidently resulted in the engines ingesting ice and snow. Once the aircraft was alive, the pilots took the aircraft under her own power out onto the snowy taxiway and lined up behind a New York Air DC-9. For forty nine minutes, the only open runway was being used for a takeoff, then a landing, a take off, and a landing and so on.
Nearly 55 minutes after pushback, the pilot decided not to return the 737 to the gate for another coating of the monopropylene glycol de-ice solution fearing that a re-application would further delay their flight. The captain and first officer had still not activated the 737’s anti ice system.
Creeping behind the DC-9 to the runway, the pilot and first officer decided that they would maneuver the aircraft so close to the DC-9 that the exhaust gases would melt the buildup of snow and ice on the wings. The First Officer said, “It’s a losing battle trying to de-ice these things. It gives you a false feeling of security, that’s all it does.” The captain replied, “Well it satisfies the Feds.” The captain was basically saying at this point that he had met the FAR requirements to shut the FAA up to show some compliance.
As the plane began its takeoff roll, the first officer finally noticed several times that the readings he was seeing on the engine panels didn’t reflect reality.
As the plane became airborne for a brief amount of time, the stick shaker immediately activated which was picked up on the CVR along with the famous last words of the First Officer to the Captain saying, “Larry We’re going down! Larry…” Which the captain replied a frantic, “I Know it!” The plane impacted the 14th street bridge at 1601 pm, nearly an hour after the 737 left the gate.
Now we can take a look into the accident.
First, we take a look at the weather. The airport should have remained closed with the given weather report. The amount of snow fall that morning should have grounded everyone at DCA.
Next, the fact the pilot decided to use the reversers. If the tug couldn’t get the traction, there was obviously a problem with the weather and Icing. However, the captain’s descion to use the reversers proved to be a mistake as the engines ingested more snow, sludge and ice which got logged into the engine itself giving the false readings on the panel that the first officer alluded to.
Next, trailing the DC-9 so closely. The captain was under the impression to reduce his delay, instead of going back to the gate to get the re-application of monopropylene glycol de icer, he would trail the New York Air DC-9 and the hot gases from the engine would melt the ice on his wings. He was correct HOWEVER, during the takeoff roll, the sludge that had melted from the gases, re-froze because the de-ice system was not activated. There was also the build up in the inside of the nacelles that was ingested during pushback.
Next, the captain knew there was ice! If he didn’t know there was ice, he wouldn’t have trailed the DC-9 with his theory. Common sense would say to bring the airplane back in to get the ice taken care of. The pilot didn’t want to induce more of a delay however. If for some reason we accept that as ok, then why wasn’t the DE-ice system on for the wings and engine nacelles? It wasn’t like it was a guessing game. It was snowing! His comment on “It will satisfy the feds” proves he was more concerned about meeting the minimums.
Last Thing is not listening to his first officer. Yes, CRM has evolved but the first officer suggested at least two or three things before the takeoff roll that should have prevented this accident if nothing else.
A person’s poor decision along with the push from dispatch to get the airplane out on time, wrecked a perfectly good 737 and took the lives of 78 lives that January day. However, along with the negatives, this accident provided us with a way to look into safer winter operations and better Crew Resource management. It is very sad that 78 people had to perish in order for us to find this out
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Living A Safety Culture
These are basic guiding principals for an organization so that every employee comes to work and comes home safely.
Safety Begins With Me
I will report anything that i see to be unsafe or needing immediate or any kind of correction
Walk The Walk
I personally belive in the safety culture of the company and talk the talk, and WALK THE WALK
I am Responsible
For the well being and safety of the company. This is my company and my chocies affect everything about it
Employee Injuries Dont Just Happen
Every accident is preventable.
Fun! Flying is fun. Let's have fun doing it! L
Safety Begins With Me
I will report anything that i see to be unsafe or needing immediate or any kind of correction
Walk The Walk
I personally belive in the safety culture of the company and talk the talk, and WALK THE WALK
I am Responsible
For the well being and safety of the company. This is my company and my chocies affect everything about it
Employee Injuries Dont Just Happen
Every accident is preventable.
Fun! Flying is fun. Let's have fun doing it! L
Saturday, October 2, 2010
When is an Aircraft Too Old
Source: When is an Aircraft Too Old? AOPA
The author begins the article by comparing the aircraft to a person. When people and airplanes grow older they tend to become more “maintenance intensive” requiring more attention to details and replacing of parts. He also says that there are owners who tend to take more out of the airplane then they can and thus they have accidents. If you were to compare this to people I would assume this to be death.
Like many aviation professionals know, airplanes are built with a certain number of cycles in mind. A cycle is usually defined as a pressurization and depressurization of the cabin, or a takeoff or landing. Before Aloha 243, not a lot of people paid much attention to the cycle count on aircraft. After the accident of Aloha 243, (which N7311 had 89680 cycles on the airframe.) manufactures started to pay much more attention to high frequency pressurized flying.
This leads into Corrosion. Something that came up in the Aloha 243 accident was the climate that the 737s were flying in. They were aluminum built aircraft flying in wet and salty, sometimes humid climate which definitely contributes to aircraft ageing. According to AOPA, aircraft in a dry climate will rot a lot slower in a dry, cool climate. This is not hard to understand.
Corrosion of the airframe is not the only danger. Corrosion of the engine and casing can be very dangerous. Like airframes, engines have a defined life and there are several variables that can affect their longevity. Believe it or not frequent use is actually a good thing for the engine. It keeps the everything moving and flowing to prevent the tendency to rot. When the airplanes are parked in the desert or when the FAA grounds an airline (in the case of Valujet) Bright yellow or distinct covers are put into place to prevent humidity and other particles from entering the engine itself and rusting or damaging the engine.
The question that AOPA has probed is does accidents increase with aircraft ages. The author states “as a general rule, no” but I want to rebut for the sake of argument really tweaking his words. I think the author needs to specify which may be redundant to the article but still, mention that “as a general rule with proper care or overhaul no.” If we look at Valujet’s fleet age with a average age of 27years (now, being 21 ½ I’m not saying 27 is old by any means for a person) the DC-9s were in desperate need of some sort of proper care from new parts to possibly new engines completely. I can even tie this example into corrosion and cycles because Valujet got their DC-9s from a hot, humid environment of third world countries that were using these aircraft for high frequency travel.
Another thing that author mentions is parking the airplanes increasing the aging process. It’s not an immediate safety problem according to AOPA but it puts the burden on the owners to pay for the maintenance when we bring those airplanes back into service. If the aircraft is outside, the aircraft tends to corrode much faster. Are we seeing a pattern yet? Corrosion is the root of evil. Window age with parking aircraft is another issue the author brings up. It tends to make a permanent haze which starts to make it harder to see and avoid other aircraft. Solution? Big airpark owners put foil on the aircraft’s windows and landing gear to prevent sun ageing and to prevent the heat build up to cause fire.
Fire can be created by a number of things with heat being a big one when insulation fails on older aircraft. Wiring is another one. If older wiring is not paid attention to, a fire may not occur (Copa 291) but a 737 can crash into the jungle from aging instrumentation wiring. Speaking of which, Gyros are usually the first instruments to go. This is because of the tendency of them to move. But how would you know exactly what failed?
An NTSB investigator knowing how structures works would be able to tell when something was corroded or rubbed together by leaving marks or fracture. Gaskets and hoses or anything that continually rubs against something else will need periodic attention to prevent contamination of fuels. This like the 25 cent Sabertech incident, a two dollar rubber ring could save an aircraft from a fatal problem all together.
In summary prolonging the life of the aircraft is like humans. If we take care of our aircraft (our body) we won’t have an accident. It’s a good theory butt accidents will happen, but maintain the airplane, we are reducing the likelihood it will happen.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)